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Abstract 
China is in transition. As such it contains a diversity of practices; residues from 
the past exist alongside modern, global ways of working and managing. This is 
very evident if we look at the question of recruitment, retention, labour turnover 
and labour mobility within the firm. This paper draws upon a case study of HR 
practices from a Jewellery factory in Shenzhen, Guangdong province, which we 
call JEWELLERY-CO. It argues that managers have, compared with the situation 
in the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), expanded their power over labour hiring 
and firing. That following established Western practice, decisions on selection, 
internal labour allocation and labour retention are largely made at the enterprise 
level, by managers acting autonomously, free from state or worker direction. 
Interviews with managers reveal a strong desire to maintain this local power.  
Power is exercised through the short-term nature of employment contracts, 
housing of migrant workers in industrial dormitories, a graded wage system, 
fines and deposits to retain labour and both a paternalistic and directive or 
authoritarian management style. Yet such powers do not go unchallenged and are 
partial, with the autonomy of management constrained by several forces.  Firstly, 
local state actors can place employees in the firm, using “political guanxi”, or 
connections.  Managers are unable or unwilling to refuse workers referred 
through these elite, politicised channels.  Secondly, worker-referred networks of 
recruitment continue to operate to place workers in the firm, despite the formal 
opposition of senior management to such connection-based forms of recruitment. 
Thirdly, kin-ethnic and work-based forms of referral can operate to distribute 
workers internally, acting against formal principles of merit or ability based 
allocation to which senior management formally subscribe.  Finally, workers can 
express opposition through ‘wild-cat’ industrial action, which while rare, 
nevertheless periodically reminds management that there is an H in HRM, and 
that workers cannot be treated as disposable and replaceable resources.  
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Introduction 
 
China has undergone significant economic reform over the past two decades. The 
goal of reform has been to move away from the mandatory central planning to a 
market-oriented system. Outcomes of the reform process have been the 
emergence of a variety of ownership forms (Naughton, 1995) and labour reforms 
(Han and Morishima, 1992; Maurer-Fazio, 1995). Ownership reform aims to 
change the predominately state ownership pattern to new forms of ownership 
structure, replacing government direction with enterprise autonomy. The result 
has had a substantial impact on employment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
From 1998 to 2001, over 25.5 million state-owned enterprises (SOEs) workers 
were laid off, representing more than one in five employees (China Daily, April 
30, 02). Meanwhile, SOEs declined steadily from 76 per cent in 1980 to 29 per 
cent in 1999 (State Statistical Yearbook, 2000). Nolan and Wang (1995:183) 
indicate that by mid-1990s, 99 per cent of total industrial enterprises were not 
owned by the state.   
 
The thrust of the ownership reform has been the ‘open-door policy’ and has 
produced a rapid growth of enterprises in the private sector including privately 
owned enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). From 1995 to 1999, 
SOEs declined by 48 per cent, while private firms grew 8 per cent per annum 
over this period (see State Statistical Yearbook, 2000). SOEs share in the 
economy, declined from around 76 per cent of total industrial output in 1980 to 
just 28.5 per cent in 1999 (Zhu and Nyland, 2002: 860). This shift to a more 
decentralized and flexible labour market has meant that the location and social 
relations of the Chinese working class has changed considerably. By the end of 
2001, there were about 135 million people working in the private sector (State 
Statistical Yearbook, 2002) and there were about 150 million surplus rural 
labourers flooding into cities for jobs (China Daily, April 29, 02). From 1998-
2002 around 30 million SOE workers were laid off yet China’s economy 
continued to advance. The private economy grew at an annual rate of 20 per cent, 
faster than the growth rate of the national economy at 9.5 per cent over the two 
decades (China Daily, April 30, 02). By the end of 2001, annual per capita wages 
for urban workers had reached 10,870 RMB (US$1,309), 16.3 times the figure for 
1978 (China Daily, April 30,02).   
 
Summarising these changes a recent book on HRM in China noted: 
 
‘Old HR practices have undergone unprecedented changes: the responsibility 
for labour allocation has shifted from a centralized planning authority to 
forecasting and planning departments within enterprises; a contract labour 
system has replaced traditional lifetime employment; open competition 
replaced authority-nominated cadre appointments for managerial positions; 
and production and reward systems moved from emphasizing egalitarianism 
to rewarding efficiency and performance.  Managers in China have started to 
show an increased interest in using HR practices, such as compensation and 
motivational systems, to increase productivity at the individual, group and 
enterprise level’ (Zhu 2005: 17). 
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China with its gradual reform rather than shock therapy appears to have been 
more successful than Eastern Europe in managing a transition away from the 
command economy (Guthrie, 1999; 2006). At the same time several important 
questions remain, in particular with regard to labour relations. As Goodall and 
Warner (1998) point out, a degree of caution is necessary in any categorization of 
‘local’ practices in China, as local government responses to the labour reform vary 
from region to region. This paper offers an in-depth case study of the current 
situation and current dilemmas concerning labour relations at a Sino-Hong Kong 
joint venture in Shenzhen, Guangdong. The purpose of the paper is to examine 
management-labour relations, employment practices and human resource, and 
the extent to which the Joint Venture (JV) case study was able and willing to 
implement market-driven labour management practices. Managing human 
resources are considered as more of a key to profitability in China than infusing 
additional capital or installing the latest technology (Kearney, 1999). The paper 
looks at the meaning of HRM when the workforce is migrant. It suggests that the 
flow of labour through the firm, the short-term contractual engagement and the 
peasant-worker status of employees makes produces a particular type of 
employment relationship, than is unique to China. The paper challenges the 
institutionalists, such as Guthrie (1999; 2006) who suggest that the adoption of 
business institutions, the labour market, private property and labour law, all 
push China down a path of ‘convergence’ with the West. The paper is closer to the 
work of Lee (2007), who suggests that the peasant-worker status of Chinese 
migrant workers gives them a loose attachment to the enterprise and waged 
labour. Lee has explored the implications of this for labour protest, whereas we 
want to look inside the labour process and employment relationship and examine 
the implication of managing people when the labourforce is composed of 
migrants. Lee (2007: X) has noted that the worker-peasant may be a temporary 
juncture, as selling labour power becomes the dominant element in the lives of 
peasant-workers, and the possibilities of living as peasants declines. 1  
 
Literature Review 
 
Human Resources in the Post-reform State-owned Enterprises 
 
Enterprise reform focuses on economic structures and the establishment of a 
modern enterprise, which has direct relevance to changes in the way the 
enterprise approaches HRM. Among the different reforms, the 1988 and 1995 
                                                 
1  Pun Ngai (has recently analysed the class discourse in China, and highlighted this shift to more 
permanent position of proletarianisation for so-called ‘peasant-workers’: The new Chinese dagong subjects 
have to live out their own class experience as part of their life struggles in concrete lived spaces. And if the 
Chinese subject was once traumatically interpellated by an alien language of class from above, then the 
dagongmei/zai, as the new subjects that have emerged at the intersection of global capitalism and the 
Chinese modernity project, invoke a desire for a return to “class analysis” at the workers’ dormitories, a 
space where the workers live out their own complexities and their conflictual life experiences.’ 
The Subsumption of Class Discourse in China 
PUN Ngai and Chris, King Chi Chan (2007) 
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laws on employment relations have had the most direct and profound impact 
upon the HRM practices in China today, especially when linked with recruitment, 
compensation and retention of labour. The labour reform comprised four main 
elements, according to Hu and Li (1993), they were:  
 
(1) Regulation on Labour Contracts - implementing fixed-term contract system 
in place of the traditional system of life-time employment, the so-called ‘iron 
rice bowl’;  
(2) Regulation on the Employment of Staff and Workers - reforming the 
recruitment system from a nationally unified system of labour allocation and 
internal recruitment to open job-application and selection with objective 
standards;  
(3) Regulation on Discharging Employees - giving the enterprises the power to 
dismiss workers;  
(4) Regulation on the Insurance of Employees - establishing a system of social 
security for the unemployed to guarantee basic livelihood and old age 
pensions for retirees.  
 
A central aim of economic reforms has been to wind back centralized economic 
decision- making, including recruitment, development, and organization of 
personnel resources.   
 
Since economic reform, top managers have devoted more time to tasks that 
involve strategic planning, and there is more delegation of decision-making 
power to lower levels. Labour is increasingly being viewed as ‘human resources’, 
which has strategic and financial implications (Benson and Zhu, 1999). The 
administration of personnel, wage decisions within the work unit, distribution of 
fringe benefits, and the evaluation of the performance of individuals are 
becoming decentralized. Department heads are given greater flexibility to carry 
out the daily activities and they receive more power to employ contract staff 
without the bureau’s approval (South China Morning Post, April 7, 1998). In 
addition, in the’80s, a new managerial system named the Management 
Responsibility System under the Leadership of Board of Directors has been 
implemented in many SOEs. Under this system enterprise managers take equal 
responsibilities to investors, employees and customers. To satisfy the investors’ 
profitability objectives and the customer’s desire for quality products at 
reasonable prices, management have reorganized the production system and 
workforce in order to reduce costs and improve productivity (Benson and Zhu, 
1999). This may necessitate recruiting more skilled workers, the introduction of 
more intensive and continuous training programmes, and the involvement of 
employees in production and quality issues. To achieve these objectives, however, 
would require early retirements and lay-offs, the introduction of new reward 
systems, and a reorganization of workflow.  
 
Notwithstanding these developments, Child (1994) has contended that the 
concept of HR is absent in Chinese enterprises. Freedom in personnel selection 
remains limited, which is due mainly to problems or the difficulties in recruiting 
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and retaining quality staff. Moreover, there remains much resistance to breaking 
the “iron rice bowl” practices, both from sections of the labour force and within 
the party (Tausky, 1991; Goodall and Warner, 1997). Although the wage system 
was reformed in the mid-1990s to match up rewards with skills, training, effort 
and productivity, the principles of pay for performance are barely present, and 
“even in large organizations….the top management only receive 4-5 times as 
much as the typical production worker” (Holton, 1990). Furthermore, incentive 
bonuses and other payments are often made to the work group and not to 
individuals, thus people are still rewarded irrespective of their individual effort. 
Thus, while cash incentives are theoretically possible, in practice they are 
egalitarian-based, not equity-based.   
 
Even among the most advanced hi-tech enterprises Warner (1999a) has argued 
that western-style HRM has not yet replaced existing personnel management due 
to organizational inertia and built-in cultural norms. Traditional Chinese 
management of teamwork, information sharing and harmonization of work are 
rooted in the collectivist approach, although they have been refined over the past 
two decades.  
 
Human Resources in the Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) 
 
Outside the state sector, the most dramatic change since 1978 has been the 
opening up of the economy to foreign investment and encouragement of joint 
ventures. In the early 1980s, FIEs started to use short-term labour contracts, 
compared with Chinese state enterprises which began giving such fixed-term 
contracts in 1986 to new employees, normally of four years maximum duration. 
According to the Chinese labour law, all job agreements must be made in writing, 
not orally, as the latter is not legally binding. Employment contracts take 
different forms, mostly in standard form set by the labour agency (FESCO). 
Under article 20 of the Labour Law, a worker may be hired for a fixed-term, or on 
an open-ended agreement, or on a job-by-job basis. It is important, therefore for 
an employer to state clearly the nature and duration of the contract. Otherwise, it 
will be assumed by the worker that he or she is on an open-ended contract. There 
is a probationary period that allows an employer to decide whether the worker is 
suitable.  In many regions of China, this period cannot exceed one month for a 
one-year employment contract.  
 
Joint Ventures (JVs) have greater freedom in hiring workers, but there remains 
as input from the Chinese partners, because in China there is a strong precedent 
for guaranteeing workers certain protections and benefits, personnel matters in 
JVs were considered to be an arena requiring strong input from the Chinese side 
(Pearson, 1991). There was a concern that Chinese workers employed in JVs 
might be exploited by working directly for foreign managers or in a firm run in 
part according to the interests of foreign investors. More specifically, there was a 
concern that in an effort by the foreign side to keep production costs low, Chinese 
workers would be paid ‘unequally’ and hence ‘exploitatively,’ or would be fired or 
punished without due cause (Pearson, 1991).  According to a recent survey, the 
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PRC labour authorities prefer for FIEs to recruit employees from its Chinese joint 
venture partner (if any), than from the locality, and only if the locality has 
insufficient qualified personnel, from outside the locality (Watson Wyatt Data 
Service, 1997). Labour bureau permission must be obtained to recruit openly in 
the locality, outside the locality and to recruit foreign workers for a project. The 
government mechanism for controlling labour movement migration to the cities 
is the residence permit, the so-called household registration system (hukou), and 
the restrictions on recruitment of labour apply to JVs and SOEs.   
 
 
Zhu (2005) describes Privately Owned Enterprises (POEs) as having a short-term 
orientation, fostered by fears of policy changes, and centrality of kinship and 
nepotism in their labour relations. Management in POEs operated with 
‘patriarchal behaviour’ making all the decisions without formal rules and 
regulations. POEs were ‘profit-maximizing’ and used a ‘short-term’ strategy 
which led them to neglect employee training and career development. 
Recruitment depended strongly on kinship and connections, which produced in 
non-standardized management practices (see also Smith and Pun, 2006). This 
form of ownership and paternalism included informal labour contracts (despite 
the law against this), arbitrary wages and inadequate labour protection. Family-
style management practices led to informality in HR planning, with enterprises 
possessing unwritten regulations on labour discipline which were verbally 
transmitted to employees on their first day of work. Bonus levels were not fixed 
but decided solely by the owner.  
 
 
‘The HR practices offered at POEs are usually characterized by less extensive 
career development and promotion procedures, except for family members; 
less reliance on formal performance appraisal and feedback; a more 
authoritarian management style; lower levels of staff training; low levels of 
explicit job analysis; a strong emphasis on the management of extrinsic 
rewards; lower levels of welfare and fringe benefits; and lack of emphasis on 
formal industrial relations procedures.’(Zhu, 2005: 17) 
 
The concept of earnings differentials has received increasing endorsement from 
the private sector. The most common practice in JVs is cantered on the post-
reform ‘post plus skills’ system, with age, position and skills determining between 
50 per cent and 80 per cent of the total payment (Goodall and Warner, 1997). 
Material rewards have become more predominant. Bonuses existed in all JVs and 
were paid individually, collectively (based on both group and enterprise 
performance), monthly or annually, with no method being typical of a particular 
enterprise type or location. However, Ding et al (2000) note that there are 
relative degrees of local and imported HR practices in terms of unionisation, 
social security contributions and rewards in FIEs in China. Further differences 
may well be found in enterprises with predominantly Asian values (Chan, 1995). 
As Goodall and Warner (1997) point out, the old eight-grade wage system and 
job-type wage-system with minimal differentials between categories may still be 
found in foreign-invested JVs as well as SOE.  
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Migrant Labour – a special feature of Chinese HRM?  
 
Both workers and employers seek to manage the labour power that is sold and 
hired and it is useful to think about labour power as possessing two components 
or indeterminacies: mobility power and effort power (Smith, 2006). The first 
indeterminacy emerges from the distinction between labour and labour power 
made by Marx, reflecting the decentralization of the authority over the disposal of 
labour power to the individual worker who has the burden and freedom 
(constraint and choice) as to where and to which employer the individual sells his 
or her labour services. This is called mobility power, which is indeterminate in 
the sense that the decision on which employer the worker parks his or her labour 
power is given to the individual and therefore remains an uncertainty for the 
employing firm in calculating whether or not workers will remain with them. It is 
also an uncertainty for the worker as to whether or not the employing firm will 
continue to require their labour services. Around the issue of mobility power 
both capital and labour strategize, plan and mobilize resources of a collective and 
individual kind as rational-strategic actors.  
 
The second indeterminacy is around labour effort and the wage-work bargain in 
production. How much effort is required for a particular wage for supporting the 
basic level of reproduction of labour has been the primary subject of labour 
process theory that has focused on management strategies to control labour and 
realize the returns from labour once hired (see Thompson and Smith, 2001 for a 
review). Similarly, how labour develops formal and informal work rules to limit 
effort and contain managerial claims on their time and body have also been 
widely discussed (Edwards, 1990). We therefore have mobility and effort power 
as indeterminacies for capital and labour, and forming the basis for labour and 
management strategies, tactics and policies to direct the exchange process within 
the capitalist employment relationship.  
 
Mobility power has a strongly political dimension – with employers seeking to 
limit the freedom of workers to move employment at will, through contracts that 
stipulate length of service, notice periods for mutual separation, and limitations 
on labour supply and mobility. Within the firm the uncertainties over mobility 
(will the employer dismiss? will the worker quit?) create what Mann (1973) calls a 
‘mutual dependency’ obligation, in which workers reduce job searching for 
internal promotion opportunities, and employers give up seeking external labour, 
through focusing on the utilization of existing labour. In some economies, Japan 
and Korea for example, and in some companies a paternalist practice is widely 
espoused that reinforce mutual obligations beyond the naked cash nexus.  
 
Thus within capitalism, the market, or competition between capitals and between 
workers, act to distribute labour to capital and capital to labour – workers to 
employers and employment to workers. In neo-classic economic theory, the 
market functions without the need for the political (state); in practice, both 
labour and capital appeal to the state to expand their ‘realm of freedom’ (controls 
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over the mobility power of labour, and controls over the mobility power of 
capital).  
 
In post-socialist China we have the emergence of market forces, labour contracts, 
freedom of employment from a single employer and freedom from state 
allocation of labour (for the firm and the worker). However, we also have the 
hukou system of population control, housing tied to employment through the 
dormitory labour system, and circulation to labour through networks of family, 
kin and localized village relationships rather than rationalized and formalized 
markets. In this way, the question of which employer the worker selects is usually 
a social or institutionalized issue and not an individual question – the migrant 
worker follows others from his or her village to the factory they have selected 
(Lee, 1998; Pun, 1999). The where or location question, is also shaped through 
these networks, but generally labour flows to areas of known economic activity, 
such as the two industrialized areas studied here. Therefore, both 
indeterminacies are kept checked through collective and institutionalized social 
networks. As we will show, these controls on mobility greatly influence work-
effort relations between capital and labour, and most important of all, the labour 
management regime embedded within China’s legacy of socialist control over 
labour mobility as it is revealed in the emergence of dormitory labour regime in 
the period of globalization in China. 
 
The use of migrant labour is characteristic of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
and makes Chinese HRM distinctive, as labour flows to employers, rather that 
the other way around, and workers are of a ‘peasant-worker’ type, without rights 
to remain in the SEZ, and constantly circulate between work and home (Lee, 
2007). Initially local governments may have had a preference when allocating 
temporary residency for those migrants from within the local province, which 
was the case with the Shenzhen government, for example, based in the province 
of Guangdong. Ip’s (1997) 7 case study of the labour market in Shenzhen 
electronics companies found 70 per cent of her sample of migrant workers were 
from within Guangdong province. But as labour reserves have been exhausted 
within the local province, migrants are recruited and come from other provinces. 
In our case study migrants from Guangdong, the local province represented only 
10 per cent of the 1700 workforce. 
 
If labour supplies are from common provinces, it is then possible for localized 
networks, in which worker’s have preferences and control, to constrain 
management’s choices, and hence for workers’ mobility power can be expanded. 
On this, much research suggests that recruitment is structured through localized, 
worker-influenced networks in China (Pun, 1997; Lee, 1998; Hare, 1999). 
Workers in these local hometown networks can create ‘work norms’ of co-
operation to ensure friends, relative and fellow locals are selected as new workers 
as the firm expands. This creates strong bonds of solidarity, often based on place 
of origin, which are deeply embedded in Chinese culture and patterns of worker’s 
organization (Pun, 1998; Smith and Pun, 2006).  
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Networked patterns of recruitment often mean firms are locked into using the set 
of contacts of existing employees to secure future supplies of labour. A survey of 
recruitment practices by Hare (1999) indicated that over 80 per cent of jobs are 
found through family, friends and village networks, with most workers knowing 
the factory they will be joining before they leave the village. Knight et al (1999:78) 
also found that the method of recruitment for 81.4 per cent of the Shenzhen 
population was through relatives or friends. Working with friends of the same 
kin-ethnic group had other benefits. Having relatives in the factory, and in 
supervisory positions, was the only possible way for workers to maintain job 
security (Pun, 1997).  In times of sickness and absence, a woman’s kin or local-
ethnic co-workers on the line would cover for her and thus help her avoid 
disciplinary reprimands.  
 
Research on network patterns of recruitment in the West indicates that it offers 
management five advantages. These are: (i) cheapness; (ii) reliable candidates 
able to learn tacit skills more quickly; (iii) greater management control, by 
devolving job obligations to the worker “recommendee” or “patron”; (iv) a 
positive effect of industrial relations; and (v) and the granting of recruitment as a 
perk or payment to loyal workers (Callaghan, 1997: 67-72). For workers, the 
advantages are that information routes provide better quality of job information 
than informal ones and workers may gain more control over recruitment, closing 
the jobs market around insiders, friends and relatives. Nevertheless, using 
localized networks for recruitment, promotion and work allocation on the shop 
floor, have contradictory benefits and liabilities for both workers and managers 
(Smith, 2003). Networks discriminate; and patronage can enmesh the worker in 
the fate of the firm, and limit his or her market opportunities. Moreover, control 
mechanisms and social safety nets are gradually being replaced with a higher 
degree of ‘market’ regulation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion we can say that research opinion is divided about the extent to 
which Western HRM practices are penetrating Chinese workplace through JVs 
and FIEs. Cooke (2005: 191-92) in what Zhang et al (2006) call the ‘positive’ 
approach to Chinese HRM, concluded a summary of much case research by 
saying: 
 
‘There is a growing body of evidence which suggests that HRM in larger 
organisations in China is becoming more systematic and, to some extent, 
more strategic. These organisation are beginning to adopt Western 
practices of HRM, notably job analysis and description, recruitment and 
selection, training and development, and performance management and 
rewards…Evidence presented [here] indicates that HRM is beginning to 
take root in China, if HRM is to be broadly defined as ‘a distinctive 
approach to employment management which seeks to achieve competitive 
advantage through the strategic deployment of a highly committed and 
capable workforce using an array of cultural, structural and personnel 
techniques’ (Storey, 1995: 5). There is a growing trend of convergence to 
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Western practices in many aspects, although a strong resemblance in 
substantive contents should not be expected’  
 
Others, Frenkel (2001) for example, have argued that in the footwear factories 
supplying to big name MNCs in China pay is better and training more developed, 
when compared with old SOEs – Guthrie (2006) suggests that JVs are better at 
training than old SOEs, for example. Gamble (2003; 2006) suggests that for a 
British invested-retailer he studied in China, that there is evidence of training 
and skill enhancement. Others, (Klein, 2000; Chan, 2001) are more in the 
‘pessimistic’ camp, claiming that wage rates in MNCs in China are at subsistence 
levels and factories generate skill-depleted work. We have a lot of sympathy with 
this latter approach, and see little in our current case study to support the 
optimistic view of China ‘converging’ with the West – a rather vague notion at 
best. The idea of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ convergence (Warner, 1996; 2004) seems to miss 
the substantive, special features defining the employment relationship in China, 
where the state, and international capital, draw benefits from migrant workers 
and the ‘dormitory labour regime’(Smith, 2003). Rather than looking for points 
of overlap, we need to see, using grounded empirical work, how these particular 
features of the Chinese context structure management choices, worker action and 
HRM practices. To this end the research presented here is developing a ‘realist’ 
approach to HRM in China, in that it does not deal with the language of ‘catch-
up’ or ‘convergence’, which is premised on comparison between China and some 
form of ‘standardised HRM’, but rather sees fundamental differences between the 
conditions of labour as structured by the state and employers in China when 
compared to other countries, and argues there is a need to present an embedded, 
institutional perspective on HRM in MNCs in China. This approach locates 
practices within a Chinese political and institutional context, but also within the 
global political-economy, which suggest that the motivations between MNCs 
location decisions in China (overwhelmingly for cost down purposes) and the 
nature of the state apparatus in reforming employment and ownership relations 
within China to facilitate FDI, are important conditions for characterising the 
actual management of HRM and labour process in China.  We hope to show the 
benefit of this approach through our case study which we will now detail. 
 
Shenzhen – A Migrant City 
 
On August 26, 2002, the people of Shenzhen celebrated the 20th anniversary of 
the Special Economic Zone (SEZ).  Shenzhen, in southern China and across the 
border from Hong Kong, has been the focus and window city since 1980s when 
the People’s Congress passed “Regulations for the Special Economy Zone of 
Guangdong Province” and officially designated Shenzhen a Shenzhen Special 
Economy Zone (SSEZ). The word “special” means special economic systems in 
which the central government provides SEZs special policies and flexible 
measures, allowing SEZs to utilize a special economic management system. The 
guideline and goal for the development of Shenzhen follows Deng Xiaoping’s 
theory on building socialism society by Chinese characteristics by taking ‘hold of 
the opportunity, deepening economic reform, open up further, promoting 
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development, and keeping stability of the society.’ SEZ was built on special 
legislation and there are a number of ways to turn it into a modern international 
city (Bell et al, 1993).  
 
 Special tax incentives for foreign investments. 
 Greater independence on international trade activities. 
 Economic characteristics are represented as “4 primacies”:  
1. Constructions primarily rely on attracting and utilizing foreign capital;  
2. Primary economic forms are Sino-foreign joint ventures and 
partnerships as well as wholly foreign-owned enterprises;  
3. Products are primarily export-oriented;  
4. Economic activities are primarily driven by market. 
 SEZs are listed separately in national planning (including financial planning) 
and have province-level authority on economic administration. SEZ’s have a 
local congress and government has legislation authority.  
 
Shenzhen now ranks the top in export revenue producer in China; with 10,000 
foreign companies, with investments from over 40 countries and regions 
(Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook, 2001). Shenzhen is only 30 kilometres from 
Hong Kong and it enjoys the geographical advantage of being the neighbour to 
Hong Kong. Their bilateral trading relationship is growing rapidly, with 14.2 per 
cent GDP growth in 2000 (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook, 2001). Nevertheless, 
Shenzhen’s success is built largely on the sweat of migrant workers and their 
average pay is $72 per month (Knight Ridder, July 27, 02). However, as we show 
in this case study, workers are earning a lot below this average. China has a 
minimum wage policy, taking into account living standards, which tends to vary 
from region to region. In Shanghai, the minimum pay for a worker was RMB 490 
a month while in Shenzhen was RMB 574, but in nearby areas such as Baoan and 
Longgan, were RMB440 (Chan, 2002).   
 
The Case Study Factory - JEWELLERY-CO 
 
The factory, which was formerly in Germany with over 120 year’s history, was 
situated at Nan Ao, the industrial suburb of Longgang district in the Shenzhen 
SEZ. It produced mainly fashion and custom jewellery and some OEM products. 
It was acquired by a Hong Kong company in 1995 and the whole factory was 
transplanted from Germany to Nan Ao. The reasons for relocating the plant to 
China were because of cheaper labour and production costs. For the first quarter 
of 1996, a group of 20 German engineers were stationed at the factory to ensure 
the technical know-how was transferred through on-site training on the Chinese 
workforce. It was the first Asian factory to use the high standard German 
electroforming process, an advanced production technique for the manufacture a 
fine quality gold chains. At the beginning, JEWELLERY-CO had fewer than 100 
workers and output was 450,000 pieces per annum. By 1999, the workforce had 
increased to 1,600 while the factory capacity augmented to 2.8 million with 
actual output in 1999 of 2.2 million pieces. The average age of the worker was 
under 22, with new starts recruited between the ages of 18-22. Productivity 
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growth was partially the result of the size of the labour force in China as 
compared with Germany, but more importantly to the lengthening of the working 
day and intensification of the labour process. The work process was broken down 
into highly standardised and quick-to-learn tasks organised into different 
production departments, and products moved between workshops where workers 
remained stationary as detailed operatives, who where replaced every two-three 
years as physical bodies, especially eyesight, became impaired with working in 
intensive, repetitive conditions. Moreover, craft trained goldsmiths and 
silversmiths who were required for so-called ‘high end ‘ production activities, 
were having their labour power systematically deskilled and replaced by 
internally trained, novice workers working for lower wages. In this sense the 
company, while claiming to be a training or learning organisation, transforming 
raw, young, migrant workers into ‘jewellery workers’ were in fact taking skills out 
of the population and creating an army of workers who’s skills were so narrowly 
specialised as to have no transferable value. This was intentional to ensure that 
skilled labour could not put cost pressures on the company or exit with usable 
skills to rival firms.  
 
The structure of JEWELLERY-CO is in the form of Sino-foreign contractual joint 
venture, which was an economic entity established jointly by foreign and Chinese 
partners in accordance with a contract signed by both parties. By virtue of the 
subcontracting arrangement, the PRC government kept close control in dealings 
involving gold and silver commodities (the latter was lifted in January 2000). 
The PRC representative in the factory acted as a watchdog and was responsible 
for ensuring compliance with Chinese regulations and customs clearing and 
licensing to import gold for production. Staff in the Hong Kong-based office were 
engaged in administration, procurement, sales and marketing, and factory 
supplies, whereas factory executives from Hong Kong were responsible for 
production as well as identifying and structuring labour pools and operational 
management for factory managers. There was no union in the company, which 
meant managerial prerogatives were largely uncontested. Over the years, the 
Hong Kong office had pursued strict management through direct and indirect 
production cost control. Factory executives were required to report on production 
and performance targets to the Hong Kong office weekly.  
 
The Case Study 
 
We gained access to the company using personal networks, and methods of data 
collection consisted of interviews, some observations of production and 
secondary analysis of data on labour turnover, recruitment processes, and 
demographic and locational information on the gender and place of origin or 
workers. We interviewed Hong Kong Managers in Hong Kong and at the factory 
in Nan Ao, and this included the Senior Personnel Managers, General Manager, 
Administrators and Production Managers. We interviewed one Chinese 
Personnel Officer and one Supervisor. In all we conducted 7 formal, taped 
interviews and several more informal discussions with managers and supervisors 
during the course of the fieldwork, during lunch and dinner times. We 
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interviewed all the main Hong Kong managers who were based in the Factory. 
We did not interview any production workers, which is obviously a limitation of 
the research, and makes it more about how managers see their relations with 
employees. The fieldwork was conducted in March and June 2002, and as well as 
the authors, Yvonne Tse acted as translator and appears in some of the text given 
below. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Hong Kong Management control 
 
The JEWELLERY-CO operated as a JV with Hong Kong management and 
imported technology. In general, personnel managers in JVs are reported as 
having a role ‘supportive’ of the business objectives of the organization, whereas 
in the SOEs there was far more emphasis on ‘bureaucracy’, ‘patriarchy’ and ‘social 
welfare’ (Westwood and Leung, 1996). In fact, JEWELLERY-CO’s organization 
structure was designed, to some degree, to control the Chinese partner and 
maintain Hong Kong management’s influence over the key decision making and 
to control the use and to avoid misuse of technology. Certain key elements of the 
business, such as positions of general manager, personnel manager, finance 
manager, and production/quality control manager, were reserved exclusively for 
the Hong Kong partner.  
 
Within the factory the position “supervisor was the highest grade” for local 
Chinese recruits, all positions above were reserved for Hong Kong recruits and 
even in certain production environments were the demands were greater (such as 
Emering) “we usually recruit HK people to the supervisory roles” according to the 
production manager. As in most factories, promotion went to “people who have 
been with the company for a while.” 
 
Selection and Recruitment   
 
The company had located the factory in a village in China, but with no intention 
of using local labour – which was in short supply, and would not be expecting to 
be searching for work in the manufacturing sector, as this manager explains: 
 
CS: Is there a preference to recruit migrant workers? 
R: No, that is not the problem; there are not many locals for us to 
employ.  I reckon it’s less than 12 employable people living in 
this village of only just over 100. 
CS: But you located here with the intention to recruit migrant 
workers? 
R: Not necessarily, but the local people might have access to 
other forms of income and do not want to work in what they 
would consider as low wage work.  They would get more from 
rental income from their lands. 
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JEWELLERY-CO recruited plenty of unskilled and semi-skilled worker-peasant 
labour through state-owned agencies that were semi-government bodies. 
Interviews with the Assistant to Director revealed that their long-distance 
migration was meant to be temporary, and that the job in itself was seen as a 
valuable asset (apart from the income) because it would create market value for 
them. As we discuss below, the actual skills acquired in the factory were so 
narrowly defined as to have no occupational market value, but skills of ‘general’ 
factory labour. For recruitment of skilled workers, some managers said that they 
tended to advertise on the newspapers; while others stressed the role of 
occupational networks.  
 
Each worker needed to provide a birth control certificate, temporary resident 
permit (costing 37 RMB) as well as an I/D card. Workers who are unwilling to 
spend money to obtain a temporary residence permit were considered illegals, 
and not taken on. New recruits had one hour oral orientation before the contract 
was signed. Hence, each worker had some limited opportunity to clarify and 
think through the terms of the conditions of work. Whether workers were 
retained depended on performance. The production manager said: “supervisors 
with the team leaders will make the decision to see if s/he is suitable after 2 
weeks; but sometimes even after 3 months workers would choose to leave.” If the 
terms were acceptable and the worker found to be suitable, they would be given a 
two-year contract. There was a 3-month probationary period that allowed an 
employer to decide whether the worker was suitable.  Suitability, was according 
to the production manager, largely about “short-sightedness, health conditions 
and physical fitness” using tests that personnel designed. It was pointed out to us 
that if workers eyesight deteriorated and they needed glasses, they would be 
dismissed. It was noticeable that no young workers wore glasses in the factory. 
Eyesight and physical fitness were essential attributes for production jobs in the 
factory, and according to the same production manager, an ideal worker should 
be “hard working, cheap, devoted, intelligent and smart”. 
 
Management targeted recruitment towards young, single migrant workers, as this 
production manager explains: 
 
CS: The company has a policy of recruiting people aged 18-22. Why do you 
think that is? 
R: I think XX [Managing Director] thinks that this is a good age group for 
apprenticeships.  For older group, say 30-35, [they] would usually have 
family commitments and it would be difficult for them to accept a low 
starting wage [RBM300 a month]. 
AL: Is this age range considered as the general practice in this area? 
R: Sometimes some company would take on 16 and 17 [year olds] as well. 
 
The workforce consisted of rural migrants from various provinces in the rural 
areas, such as Hunan (17 per cent), Sichuan (12 per cent), Guangxi (11 per cent), 
Guangdong (10 per cent), Anhui (9 per cent), Hubei (9 per cent) and Jianxi (7 per 
cent). No particular region dominated. See the map below: 
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Within the factory the distribution of migrants looked like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
2004 
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Contrary to literature review, the use of guanxi (personal relations) to tap into 
pre-existing networks of personal loyalties or referral was not strongly in 
evidence and was discouraged as managers at JEWELLERY-CO had negative 
experience of referral recruitment. There are a number of reasons why 
connection based recruitment was discouraged. One was to avoid disruption and 
instability caused by the pre-existing ties of guanxi. As the production manager 
said:  
 
When employees are recruited through the existing workforce, it can easily 
create worker solidarity and cooperation in terms of information sharing 
on wages and working conditions. Favouritism to certain provinces is 
discouraged…. We don’t recruit many local people because they have local 
mentality - less responsible, less hard working.  
 
Another reason was to avoid collective cheating or theft. It was also the case that 
related migrants were difficult to manage. In reality, there was a considerable 
overcrowding in the urban ‘unofficial’ labour market, especially after the Chinese 
New Year holidays, big cities were invaded by millions of job seekers 
(Christiansen, 1993). During our fieldwork migrant workers were always a 
presence outside the factory gates – the labour market literally breathing down 
the backs of the workers inside. It is not a problem to recruit new and unskilled 
migrant workers. In fact, foreign firms establishing plants in China are often 
advised against using worker networks or guanxi for recruitment.  This is 
thought to create ‘personnel nightmares’ with ‘pressure to hire undeserving 
candidates, conflict among those recommending new employees for the same 
post, low productivity among workers who feel secure in their positions and 
problems of getting rid of poor workers later’ (Sensenbrenner and 
Sensenbrenner, 1994). The personnel manger continued: 
 
‘The recruitment through quanxi relationship becomes weak to prevent 
collective bargaining and the development of social safety nets. We also worry 
that the performance of those who have recommended workers will be 
adversely affected if their referrals are later dismissed’ 
 
The worker recruited through a social tie is more likely to owe allegiance to his or 
her job ‘patron’ rather than the manager or the company.  Opposition to such 
practices from management commentators indicates the potency such practices 
have for workers, although this again is of a particular type.  
 
However, while in principle against connection-based recruitment, the company 
had to accept ‘political guanxi’, workers recommended to the company by various 
government agencies, as the personnel officer explained: 
 
“[With] recommendations by government officials, we would have to accept the 
person. [For example the] Labour Department, District Government, Business 
Tax Section, Custom & Excise; those [are the ones] that give us headaches.  
These types of recommendations are quite common in here.  Workers who come 
into the factory through these routes are the ones who would normally violate 
 18 
the company rules because they think they have “supports”.  They are quite 
difficult to manage.” 
 
Such workers were ‘difficult to manage’ because they had access to authority 
external to the management hierarchy, but also because they could use this 
borrowed authority within the workplace, for such things as choosing their area 
of work and moving between jobs – something that workers recruited directly by 
management could not do. In fact our evidence suggests that movement between 
departments was low in general to reinforce specialisation of work along narrow 
Taylorist lines: “Most of them [those recruited through political guanxi] would be 
working in the factory, although they would request to be allocated to better 
jobs”. Moreover, management placed fewer demands on this group, due to having 
more restricted direct authority over them:  
“Also they, management staff, would not make too many demands on them, 
too.  In our views, these people should work harder to thank the person who 
got them the jobs, but the realities are usually quite different.”  
 
According to the Personnel Officer only 2 per cent of workers were recruited 
through ‘political guanxi’, but it was difficult to determine the numbers within the 
factory who heard about their job through recommendations from insiders, but 
as noted earlier empirical evidence suggests this was likely to be high. 
 
Skilled labour and Network Recruitment 
 
Worker-based recommendations were discouraged in order for management to 
maintain authority over the entry of labour into the factory. Only in hard-to-
recruit, specialist areas was it seen as useful, “if the factory is in need of a skilled 
person and a right match is recommended then that is good” noted the personnel 
officer. The Production Manager concurred when asked “how do you fill shortage 
in skilled areas?” he immediately said: “mostly by referrals.” Further the High 
End [most skilled production area] Supervisor when asked how people get to 
hear about jobs in skilled areas and elsewhere, said: “mainly through friends as 
jobs in this sector are seldom advertised in the paper.” The Table below indicates 
that in the more skilled area of stone setting, there was indeed a concentration of 
workers from a particular region, Guangxi: 
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If we compare this with more general department, such as Emering or Polishing, 
one can see less concentration of labour from a particular province. However, 
contrary to what management said, there is some concentration: 
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Widespread as the connection-based recruitment method was in Chinese 
factories dependent on migrant workers, according to the Personnel Officer, “the 
negatives are more than the positives”, and only “if the potential worker actually 
had an agreement with the person who is recommending that he/she will work 
hard and delivers it” would it be useful, but his experience was more that 
connection gave power to the worker to reduce not increase effort. 
Asked about the distribution of workers by place or origin, the Production 
Manager said: 
 
R: We have 12 departments [and] no allocation is made by place of origin.  I only 
inform Personnel how many workers are needed in each department.  People 
might get grouped together by chance. 
CS: Is there a policy on that? 
R: I think Personnel had had bad experiences with people from Hunan by referral 
from the Government’s Custom Department.  I guess this was part of the 
governmental liaison tasks. 
YT: Would the company allocate people together due to common dialects or 
districts? 
R: I think Personnel want to keep them separated. 
CS: How many people would you think have joined the company based on personal 
relationship?  
R: A few, not many.  We will treat them the same as others and don’t get any 
special treatments. 
 
Another way of checking to see if the distribution of migrants is random or by 
chance, rather than through provincial grouping, is to examine the dispersal of 
provincial migrants across the departments. When this is done, most are evenly 
distributed; however, migrants from Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan and Sichuan 
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show some departmental clustering. This reflects both skill specialisation, with 
some migrants over-represented in high-end areas, and possibly kin-ethnic 
networking, as same-province migrants seek each other out. Without more data, 
such as sub-provincial origins of workers, or interviews with workers to see if 
they have family and friends in the factory, these conclusions are somewhat 
speculative. However, they do call into question repeated claim by management 
informants that migrants were deliberately randomly dispersed. 
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Distribution of Guangxi Migrants by Department
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Distribution of Hunan Migrants by Department
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The hands-on approach of Hong Kong management meant that the company was 
not dominated by connection based recruitment as was the previous, Japanese 
firm that he had worked for: “the problems were more serious at the Japanese 
company because apart from important posts, the Japanese management were 
not involved with the recruitment process”. More widely, he noted: “in China this 
situation [connection-based recruitment] is quite serious, I think it’s about 20 to 
30 per cent [of the total recruitment], more so in family run business and 
processing plants.” But asked about the future, he noted: “through talking to 
friends in the personnel field the majority of the people think that in China now 
more and more people are more aware of the negative effects of the connection-
based recruitment method, therefore I think the situation will get better.” 
 
Compensation  
 
As discussed above, in state enterprises before their reform an egalitarian wage-
payment system with a flat reward structure existed. Since the reforms of the 
mid-1980s, a change occurred with material rewards becoming more 
predominant. Both JVs and SOEs had moved to a performance based reward 
system. Workers’ high efficiency was due to the contracted responsibility system, 
under which they were paid according to their performance, and to a ‘fair’ system 
of rewards and penalties (Warner, 1999a). 
 
New entrants received 300 Yuan per month (= US$ 43.74) for 180 hours basic 
work.; Overtime (4 hours per day plus 1 or 2 days week end work is paid at 1,5 
day rate; and double time Sunday and Statutory Holidays ) 
After: 3 months later 350 per month Yuan 
  6 months later 400 per month Yuan 
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  9 months later 450 per month Yuan (US$ 65.61);   
 
At JEWELLERY-CO, the package of benefits was kept to the minimum but 
workers had been protected with regard to their medical insurance. The company 
contributed 6.6 RMB medical insurance for each employee, which covered 
sickness, on-the-job injuries, accidents and deaths. In case of injury or death the 
company paid 100 per cent of the costs incurred. In addition, JEWELLERY-CO 
adopted a wage increment system and employees were divided into 10 ranks, 
broken down into 5 grades. Grades were: apprentice, junior, lower middle, upper 
middle to senior. Rank 1 and 2 were departmental managers whereas 3 and 4 
were senior staff, who were experienced and had a degree, such as supervisor, 
engineer, and craftsmanship.  They also needed to be skilful in their specific area. 
Rank 5, 6 and 7 composed of middle management, such as merchandisers and 
line leaders as well as skilled workers, such as sample makers. Line leaders were 
promoted from below. Rank 8 and 9 are clerical workers, inspectors, and less 
skilled workers. Unskilled workers or apprentices fall under Rank 10.  
 
For new employees at the entry level, that is, under the ‘apprentice’ category, a 
total monthly real wage was RMB 300, for 180 basic hours. This equated to 
US$43.74  per month or $0.24c per hour. However new workers only actually 
received RMB 240 (80 per cent) as 60 RMB (20 per cent) was retained to cover 
the costs of meals - breakfast, lunch and dinner. But the basic wage did not 
include the overtime pay and pay on statutory holidays. The Production Manager, 
when asked if higher wages would make his job easier said: “in order to maintain 
high motivation a better wage or benefit system would be helpful but we need to 
strike a balance.” Entry wage rates fell below the statutory minimum and were 
extremely exploitative. A senior manager explained how they paid RMB300 and 
‘got round’ paying RMB440 which was the minimum wage: 
 
“We are in communication with the Labour Bureau and they are aware of the 
figures.  We can apply this practice because we have no complaints from the 
workers. Secondly we ensure that the total pay shown on the pay slip meets the 
minimum wage by showing the subsidised items on it.  For example, meals, 
accommodation subsidies and Attendance Allowance…At present in order to 
show a worker is on at least 440 RMB a month we show Attendance Allowance 
30 RMB, meals subsidy 80 RMB and Accommodation 30 RMB to make up the 
total.” 
 
Lee (2007) has researched the growing legal consciousness amongst migrant 
workers, and the isolation of this factory might explain why managers were able 
to get awy with abusing workers’ rights. Obviously the costs of these actual firm-
dependent “subsidies” were non-transparent, which is a major problem with 
having so-called welfare benefits mediated through the company and not the 
state or market (Smith, 2003).  
 
Wages were adjusted every three-months, provided entry workers passed the 
probation period. For convenience sake, some supervisors offered a rise of 50 
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RMB every 3-month but the management discouraged the practice of ‘automatic’ 
wage rises. The company’s wage incentive programme provided some variations 
for individuals, and for good performers the increments could go up to 360/370 
RMB, but less for poor performers, such as 330/340 RMB per month. Within a 
year, wages could be reaching 500 RMB; for impressive workers up to 520 or 540 
RMB with a performance-based bonus. After that, the wage was reviewed 
annually and increment would not be more than 10 per cent except for 
outstanding workers. Within the apprentice grade, the reward reflects no wage 
differentials, remnants of ‘iron rice bowl’ pay categories, as almost all workers 
receive the same amount of wages in a year.  Year-end bonus amounted to almost 
80 per cent of the worker’s salary, and acted as an incentive to remain with the 
company. In interviews, the production manager admitted that the targets were 
set high and hard to attain: 
 
R: For Emering the average target is 25 pieces.  This target is quite difficult for 
them to do …The target figure is left to the judgment of the supervisors.  If a 
worker is outstanding in meeting the targets then there is a case for wage 
readjustment.  The supervisors know what can be expected from their teams.  
Targets are set on a departmental basis and it takes into account of the 
complexity of the pieces. 
CS: Do you think the reward package is a fair one for the workers? 
R:  I cannot say it’s 100 per cent fair but it is set by management…. in Hong Kong 
workers have to work hard for their pay. 
 
For experienced workers, the starting wage was dependent on their past 
experience. By custom and practice, it was either a 10 per cent wage increase or a 
rank higher than the previous job. There was no ceiling for skilled workers who 
could earn three times the wage of junior workers and they enjoyed better 
collective welfare facilities, and in this case the dormitory. The company had no 
performance appraisal in the reward system. In March 2000, JEWELLERY-CO 
started a new wage grading system for senior and experienced workers. 
Supervisors needed to submit justification reports for any recommendations. The 
personnel manager would review the recommendation first and then seek final 
approval from the top management. There are two types of promotion within this 
ranking system: one is called “single route” and the other “double route.” Single 
route means promotion within the same grade. For instance, if work performance 
is outstanding, in the annual performance review, employees would be 
recommended to move to another rank. Double route means moving from one 
grade to another, for example, from junior staff to middle management.  
 
Workers worked 8 hours a day and 6 days a week, from 8 to 12 p.m., then a 2-
hour break for lunch. Normally, workers would have a quick lunch and go back to 
the dormitory for a nap. The canteen was cleared after just 30 minutes. Work 
resumed from 2 to 6 p.m. The night shift started at 9:30 p.m. till 6:30 p.m. with 
shift rotation every 2 months. Overtime work was from 7 to 9 p.m. Overpay 
depends on the national standard which is not less than 1.5 times the regular rate. 
On rest days (Sundays) or statutory holidays, overtime was double the normal 
rate. China observes ten paid statutory holidays. Pay for Sunday work is 1.5 per 
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cent of the normal rate. Very often workers at JEWELLERY-CO worked seven 
days a week and the average amount of overtime is 70 hours per month, nearly 
double the 36 hours permitted under Chinese labour law.     
 
In terms of bonus, there were two types, one is called hardship bonus, depending 
on the nature of the work, and the other is called position bonus. Position bonus 
was restricted to Rank 4 to 7. Supervisors, assistant supervisors, and line leaders 
at rank 4, 5 and 6 respectively could receive an additional of 300 RMB a month, 
whereas assistant line leaders at rank 7 received 150 RMB. Hardship bonus was 
for those who worked for waxing and casting, polishing and laser operating. They 
would earn 5 RMB extra a day. Bonus could be taken away if they could not 
perform to expectation. The monthly bonus, according to the personnel manger, 
“can be regarded as an incentive since it is decided by position and work nature”. 
 
Furthermore, wages varied for different production lines and were highly flexible 
for skilled workers. Production comprised of pre-production and post-
production. Pre-production included three steps: Bangling and Stamping, 
Waxing and Casting which cover a number of processes: - wax mould making - 
wax tree making - investment mixing (a difficult process, using employees with 
more tenure to reduce the risk of stealing gold) - Casting (all males) - spruce 
cutting (even distribution by sex), and electro-forming. Post-production includes: 
Emering – smoothing rough objects - (even distribution of sex), Stone Setting (30 
per cent were females), Polishing (physically demanding and an all male 
environment), Plating or Galvanic (Laser), Stone Gluing, Colouring, Final QC and 
Packing. Female-dominated areas were stone gluing, colouring and packing, and 
some of these areas required ‘delicate’ skills. The factory employed more women 
to men because they were more subordinate and easier to manage. A mainland 
Chinese personnel officer noted:  
“Of course, women workers are easier to manage. They listen to you more.  
If there are specific tasks which require men to do then we will have to 
employ men.  If all things are equal I think women are better.  At present 
the ratio is 1:1.”  
In sample making or master molding which was concerned with product 
development, the most important department, men dominated (with only 20 per 
cent of workers female). Pay was used as a retention device in these areas, as the 
Personnel Officer indicated: “because it [sampling] is a skilful department, the 
workers there command the highest wages in the company, and higher wage 
workers tend to be quite stable.” The company had a strategy to substitute skilled 
labour with general labour through a systemic process of job fragmentation.2 
However this strategy was not always possible, as this senior Hong Kong 
personnel manager explains: “sampling and stone setting required more skills 
and it is difficult to get skilled workers. Moreover there is a market price for these 
                                                 
2  The situation had changed on my last fieldwork trip to the factory, and under pressure from a major 
client, a dedicated training suite had been established; workers for this client received more off-the –job 
training and jobs were getting bigger. This trend highlights to the problem with skill formation under the 
current dormitory migrant labour system, which has a in-built tendency to minimise not up-skill workers. 
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skills, whereas skills in other areas are not difficult to learn.”  Theoretically and 
practically, skilled labour had market, hence mobility power, and could exit to 
command wages or use the threat of exit to push for higher wages (Smith, 2006). 
Such bargaining or mobility power depended upon the philosophy of 
management, and the same manager noted: “if the supervisors recommend a rise 
[for these skilled groups] we would consider it but they don’t get preferential 
treatments.  Other companies will tend to reward these 2 groups of workers 
more.” So the general management philosophy was to pursue deskilling to reduce 
costs and labour market pressures from the very few groups of workers whose 
labour power commanded occupational wages. 
 
The entry wage was low, but management justified this partly on the ground that 
they were taking in unskilled labour and putting in training which then had a 
market value: “this company is acting as a large training centre for the unskilled 
labour.  Although the pay is not that good here but we are willing to take them on 
and once they are skilled they can work elsewhere to get a better wage.” Yet the 
same manager admitted, without contradiction, that training was narrowly 
specialised and workers had “little” opportunity to transfer between departments 
to acquire additional skills and therefore increase their market value. This he 
attributed to the instrumentality of migrant workers (not the way management 
organised the labour process) whose principle motivation was money not training 
or skill acquisition: 
 
CS: Once a worker is allocated to a department is there any opportunities for a 
transfer? 
R: Little. You’ve got to understand that most of workers are unskilled young people 
from the North.  The primary aim for most of them is to earn as much as 
possible in the 2 or 3 years they are here.  Only a few want to be trained up in 
any particular skill [and] would ask to be transferred which [would] usually 
involve a drop in salary. 
 
As noted above, most migrant workers where from adjacent provinces and not 
the North. 
 
Moreover there was no wage difference between departments, with the exception 
of the three skilled areas, and the main wage differentiation was between dirty, 
hard work, such as polishing, and lighter, cleaner areas. Requests for transfer 
were therefore not motivated by wages but material conditions in the different 
departments, as this Senior Personnel Manager explained: 
“There is not much difference in wage level between skilled workers regardless 
of the departments they are in.  For physically demanding jobs workers get an 
extra 5 Yuan daily allowance.  But we get very few requests to move into that 
type of work.  If fact we have more requests for existing workers to be 
transferred to less demanding job units.” 
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Workers in sample making and stone-setting, because of the unique handicraft 
required, were more autonomous in terms of remuneration and employment.  
The craft nature of these “high end” jobs, meant according to the High End 
Supervisor, that management had both to pay for craftsmanship, but also seek to 
deskill the production process to reduce the costs involved with recruiting these 
workers: 
 
“…because it [high end work] is craft based work, a company is prepared to pay 
for good workmanship.  Most companies don’t want turnover but their needs to 
be a way of dealing with high wage labour.  Letting high wage labour go, 
training and promoting from lower pay staff is one way of controlling costs.  
This is a fact of life; every company faces the same problem.” 
 
Connection-based recruitment may have also declined as a result of this 
deskilling process of replacing skilled craftsmen with those recruited and trained 
from within the factory, as the High End Supervisor noted: 
 
R: None of my family is in the trade so [there was] no help from that side.  The 
relocation of the jewellery trade into China [from Hong Kong] started less than 
20 years ago.  Most of the news comes from friends working in the trade within 
different firms. 
CS: So in your department is your source of workers also from recommendations? 
R: Yes, especially if we are looking for experienced and skilled workers. 
YT: Does this mean most of the workers in your section are either friends or family? 
R:  This is less so now as more people are trained up from below within the firm, it 
was more of the case in the past. 
 
 
Retention  
 
Staff retention in all FIEs is a critical issue (Goodall and Warner, 19998) and each 
company tries to defend its human assets against competitors. With the 
implementation of the new social protection system, it is more likely that 
employees will select their jobs based on their skills rather than the ownership 
type of an enterprise.3 The factory faced the situation where workers might leave 
                                                 
3  The social protection system implemented since 2000 is financed by tripartite co-ordination of 
individuals, enterprises and government with the aim of alleviating the responsibility of publicly owned 
enterprises for employees’ welfare and forcing individuals and enterprises in the non-public sector to make 
their due contributions. The new system attempted to establish a link between the individual’s contribution 
and his/her social security benefit to provide an incentive to work and save. Li (2000), the president of 
Chinese Academy of Social Science, said that the goal in the social protection reform was to establish a 
nation-wide social society system that “fits the socialist market economic system, has many channels for 
fund raising, has multi-levels of security, connects contributions to benefits and is run by the government 
instead of individual enterprises.” Research showed that JVs did not object to provision of welfare 
functions that the state enterprise itself traditionally provided and to fulfil these functions, even though they 
increased costs. However, the new pension system was not universally implemented and applicable to all 
the workers. For instance, the government, which was in charge of the labour relations, specified a quota of 
15 per cent for JEWELLERY-CO. It proved to be quite a problem for the firm to select 255 staff out of 
1,700. As a consequence, JEWELLERY-CO chose those by seniority. Selected staff contributed 3 to 4 per 
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after staying two to three years. Due to the possibility of high job turnover, there 
were a number of tactics management used to retain competent workers. 
JEWELLERY-CO had maintained traditionally individualized tasks and 
responsibilities. Basically, there was no job rotation. Workers had to stay in the 
same department for the same job. They were restricted to specific skills and the 
skills were not transferable to other departments.  Hence, internal transfer was 
rare - an average of 5 production workers were moved between departments per 
month in 2000-01. As the Personnel Officer explained: “in my view, most 
business seems to favour single skill development for the majority of their 
workforce [and] in fact, it appears that they do not encourage multi skills 
development.” This was because: “for most businesses, production comes first.  If 
they allow multi skills development the workers may not be able to focus on their 
jobs and may lead to a reduction in their productivity.” In other words a classical 
Taylorist perspective of task specialisation prevailed – by sticking to one task the 
worker increased individual dexterity and hence productivity. Moreover, task 
specialisation meant workers could be trained cheaply and quickly. Another 
manager commented: “I don’t think the training cost is high; if we compare the 
volume of orders, the training costs are insignificant”.  Building a specialised 
labour force with a ‘build in’ turnover after 2-3 years was only possible because of 
the continuous supply of labour in China, as the same manager noted: “after 
Chinese New Year I had to replace 80 workers, in one day I got the 80 I wanted 
and within 2 days I got 200 workers.” 
 
According to the data provided, the labour turnover rate for the factory in 2000 
and 2001 was 5 per cent and 4.4 per cent respectively, see tables below. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
cent of the average monthly salary, depending on seniority, while the company’s contribution to the 
pension was 6 per cent of the payroll. This further segmented the workforce. The new pension system 
advocated that a worker’s contribution should be linked to his/her ultimate pension benefits while the 
government portion of the pension should be enough to keep retirees from poverty (Stevenson-Yang and 
Shi, 1998). The pooling fund was administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, which 
charged a 2 per cent management fee, would transfer the accumulative fund to an employee’s respective 
province and municipalities once he/she left the firm. This actively facilitated the labour mobility between 
different types of enterprises, as redundant employees or employees who were dissatisfied with their 
current jobs became more willing to look for jobs elsewhere rather than sticking to the SOE merely for its 
social protection coverage. While the traditional social protection system contributed to “an extreme lack of 
labour mobility” in China (Howard, 1991), the benefits of it was to encourage workers to move across 
enterprises, industries or sectors and they become far less dependent on the labour market for survival.  In 
such circumstances the power of the market over workers is reduced. To deter high labour turnover, 
particularly the skilled ones, companies like JEWELLERY-CO had to develop strategies to retain them, 
which will be discussed in the next session.   
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There was a relationship between below legal wages and turnover according to 
the production manager: “most voluntary [turnover] exits [are] because of [the] 
low wage.  The [statutory] regulation here specifies 400 RMB per month but we 
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only provide 300 RMB.  But after a year’s service most workers would get 500 
RMB.” 
 
Within the average, there were some higher turnover rates, with 18 per cent in 
2001 attributed to the Emering and Polishing workers, accounting for 36 per cent 
and 13 per cent of total workers respectively. This departmental ‘blip’ was 
addressed through a big internal transfer. As noted earlier, internal transfers 
were generally extremely low due to the policy of task specialisation. According to 
the head of the High End Workshop, most difficulty was in the recruitment and 
retention of highly qualified technical staff. To retain skilled workers, they 
employed a consultant firm to provide them workshop training. Most of the 
training was on the job. But it seems this was not an effective strategy to retain 
skilled labour.   
 
The deposit system 
 
Adopting a deposit system was another way to retain workers. Deposit money 
was a deduction from the workers’ monthly wages, ranging from 50 to 100 RMB 
for unskilled workers. For those wages reaching RMB 1,000 and above, the 
deduction was 10 per cent of the salary. Nevertheless, the deduction for the 
deposit had a maximum limit. For senior workers the deposit was 1,200 RMB 
and for more experienced and technical staff the deposit could be 2,000 RMB. 
Once the new workers had been with the factory for a year, they would recoup 
100 RMB from their deposit. The partial return of the deposit at the first year was 
a promise and they would get the rest of their deposit money at the end of their 2-
year contract. The deposit money had accumulated to 1 million RMB for the 
entire workforce. As the Personnel Officer indicated, the deposit system was used 
for purposes of labour retention, with workers who quit before the end of their 
contract losing their own accumulated wages held by the management as a 
deposit. This is a form organised theft, but is a widespread practice within an 
employment system based on migrant labour: “workers who want to leave early 
without acceptable reasons have to suffer economic penalties.” 
 
The deposit serves other purposes for the company. First, management stressed 
the issue of security. As the nature of business at JEWELLERY-CO involves metal 
“gold” handling, stealing was a constant possibility. The deposit could be used as 
a form of financial guarantee against theft. The factory had an incident when a 
worker took 40 rings and ran away during one lunch time.  
 
Second, it is a labour retention device for workers to stay long enough to pay back 
the company’s investment, such as uniform, lodging and training. There was 
considerable confusion over the actual length and costs of training, with some 
managers saying training was 2 weeks or 1 month or as high as US$100 per 
annum, which translated into just over 3 months work. We can safely assume 
that during the first 3 months workers were productive for the company, as 
training was on-the-job; hence we should be sceptical at the $100 training claim 
per worker. In another interview, a senior Hong Kong manager said that the first 
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month was the period of training and preparation of workers, hence this would 
only cost the company US$37, not US$100: “Under our system, the first month is 
really an investment for the workers, we provide uniform, clothes and teach them 
skills it is only later on that they will be able to contribute back to the to the 
company.” Nevertheless there was a training element to the job as the company 
was targeting unskilled labour in order to keep labour costs low. Therefore by 
putting economic penalties in the way of premature exiting may be seen as a 
rational way of ensuring that the firm receives a payback for this initial 
investment. However, training was brief (although this was changing), because 
the labour process was deliberately deskilled with fragmented specialised tasks, 
no multi-skilling or tasking, hence one can assume that taking a deposit to recoup 
training costs was not the primary motivation for the practice.  
 
Third, the system offers an excellent short-term solution to staffing problem by 
deterring job change. The personnel manager said: “If we don’t have this deposit 
system then the worker may leave after 4 to 5 months.” 
Fourth, it works against workers not returning work after a long break, such as 
the Lunar New Year holiday. Wage payment falls on 15th of every month when 
workers receive the previous month’s wages.  In other words, there is a half 
month unpaid wages for the workers which is a common practice in the industry. 
Workers normally would not receive any pay before the holiday. If they breached 
the contract or were not returning after the holiday, they would forfeit one and a 
half month’s salary plus the deposit deducted for each month.  It was used as a 
means to retain the labour by acting as an economic coercion or tax: 
 
Interestingly, the deposit money runs in parallel with the deposit at the National 
Union.  In case JEWELLERY-CO suffered losses or bankruptcy, there should be 
protection of employee rights and interests, and hence each JV is required to 
contribute a pool of money to support the National Union. The amount is based 
on calculations against sudden closure of the business. According to the 
personnel manager of JEWELLERY-CO:  
Although the government discourages the deposit system, we talked with 
the local Labour Department in Longgang District to make a point that we 
are a ‘special case’ and they’ve agreed. While we deduct money from the 
workers’ wages, the government is requesting a deposit for the National 
Union against bankruptcy. Only the National Union and an appointee from 
our company, head of our Chinese partner, are allowed to access to this 
separate joint account. If the business is closed down the Union can access 
the deposit to compensate workers.      
 
While management at JEWELLERY-CO sought to put a rational and unique gloss 
on their reasoning for using the deposit system, the fact was that it is not a 
company or industry-wide practice, but typical of the actions of employers in the 
SSEZ (Chan, 2001; Eng, 1997; Lee, 1998; Pun, 2005; Smith, 2003). Therefore one 
should judge the practice as an adaptation to migrant labour, within a context 
where workers have limited or no collective representation and employers 
possess significant coercive powers to restrain the autonomy of waged labour to 
exercise ‘mobility power’ (Smith, 2006) which is characteristic of capitalist 
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practice, especially in more liberal economies. Hence deposits detain labour for 
the benefit of the employer not the worker, and JEWELLERY-CO is 
representative of this employer prerogative. 
 
Termination 
 
Except for experienced and skilled workers, ironically, JEWELLERY-CO did not 
want to retain their young workforce. They used non-renewal of contracts to get 
rid of them when their eyesight deteriorated.  
 
• “...we are not going to dismiss people just because they’re older.  Having said 
that, many do leave after the 2 year contractual period.  I prefer people to leave 
while they haven’t collected much dust in their lungs.  I’d rather not have people 
making claims (against the company) later on.” 
– Senior Hong Kong Manager 
 
Young workers also wanted to return to their home village after saving money. 
For any early termination, there is no exit interview and one month’s notice was 
required. For female workers, many return home at 23, the appropriate age for a 
young woman to marry in much of rural China. According to the Personnel 
Officer, “They will either help the family in the rural area to build a house, to pay 
back the family loan or to get married. Often their (female workers) families will 
have found eligible bachelors during their absence.” For the skilled ones, the 
perceived impossibility of being promoted beyond a certain level and competitive 
market wages also have a negative impact on staff turnover rates. This would 
almost certainly result in the younger and more highly trained employees being 
lost to the enterprise.  
 
In 1993 the SSEZ completed an All Employees Contract System (AECS), which 
covered staff and workers in all enterprises. New employees have been contracted 
for only a short period between one and five years (Zhu and Campbell, 1996). The 
Chinese dimension of inheriting staff is that the JV may be faced with involuntary 
retention of staff. Under the 1994 Labour Law, employees with more than ten 
years’ service are entitled to non-fixed term contracts – in effect, life time 
employment (Josephs, 1995; Zhu, 1995; Ng and Warner, 1998). Companies 
entering into a JV agreement who are not careful to mark the start of a new 
employment contract may find they have to involuntary retained a certain 
number of unwanted employees.  
 
Conflict 
 
There had been some wildcat strikes in the factory, which are very common 
across the region (Leung, 1998; Smith and Pun, 2006; Lee, 2007). Often these 
were about unpaid wages, working condition s, redundancies and many other 
traditional industrial relations grievances. In the case below, the spontaneous 
action of workers did force management to increase its pay offer, and therefore 
could be seen as successful, and patry of the pattern of short-strikes typical of the 
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southern ‘sunbelt’ regions of China (Lee, 2007). However, it is typical of these 
spontaneous strikes that they have not produced more formalised bargaining, but 
rather intensified management communication and control. 
 
R: In the past there has been 2 to 3 strikes.  Once it involved the young workforce 
expected advance payment before they went home for Chinese New Year and 
another time was about dissatisfaction with the rate increment… Personnel 
might have needed to handle the bad news in a more diplomatic way.  The 
advance payment before New Year might be due to how the date fell within that 
particular month.  Workers might have heard that other companies were 
paying in advance even New Year date was at the beginning of the month. 
CS: How long did the strike last? 
R: Just a few hours, the workers just stopped working. 
CS: How did they communicate the news with each other? 
R: We asked the supervisors to tell the workers even if they go on strike we still 
won’t be able to help them.  It is illegal to be on strike in China. 
AL: Did the workers accept the 5 per cent offer? 
R: We tried to explain to them it was an average increase for everyone.  But 
eventually some department had a better rate at 6 per cent or 7 per cent. 
AL: Did that create any negative impacts or distrust of the management, as they 
didn’t keep to their promise? 
R: It was not so much about not keeping to the promise.  It was more to do with the 
timing of the news and how it was communicated to them.   
YT: When did it take place? 
R: It happened April 01 last year and then around Chinese New Year 02. 
AL: Did anyone get punished and did they have to work overtime on that day? 
R: No one was punished and we stuck to our schedule on the day. 
 
The way to avoid strikes was ‘better communication’ and for supervisors to be 
‘closer’ to workers and anticipate problems better. There was no sense that strike 
action would lead to formal arrangements for workers and managers to discuss 
collective issues. It was very much about management control and personalised 
relationship management: 
 
R:  Last year we had a regrettable incident.   The original holiday was 
planned or 2nd to 25th February then changed to 6th to 20th and changed 
again to 11th to 16th. We had to ask people to work more overtime.  I think 
part of the problem was caused by the supervisor’s attitude when asking 
people to do overtime.  I suspect they were not very diplomatic and might 
have even threaten to issue an AWOL [Absence Without Leave, punishable 
by dismissal] notice for workers did not agree to do overtime. 
YT: Since this instance, would you consider changing your grievance system? 
R: After this incident we talked to workers directly and asked 
supervisors to be more diplomatic when making requests.  We 
expect supervisors and line-leaders to be more observant of what is 
going on on the ground. 
 
Management Control and Dormitories 
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As noted above, all employees were migrants. In keeping with the widespread 
practice in the area, they were overwhelmingly accommodated in industrial 
dormitories rented by the factory from the local Nan Ao local authority. As has 
been suggested elsewhere, (Smith, 2003; Smith and Pun, 2006) having workers 
‘on tap’ in Chinese factories gives management a control dividend, which is not 
available in other production regimes in other parts of the world, making Chinese 
workers not simply cheaper than others, but also, capable of having their labour 
power managed and accessed more readily. The production manager voices this 
control premium, as well as a paternalistic concern with young workers (“boys 
and girls”) interacting together outside the workplace, and out of view of 
management: 
 
CS: Do you think there are any benefits having workers living in the dormitories? 
R: I prefer workers to live in dormitories because if they live outside it is more 
difficult to control them.  They could group together and steal things or do other 
things.  Also girls and boys meeting outside are not so good. 
CS: What are the advantages for you as the Production Manager, from the point of 
view of production, of living in the dormitory? 
R: Closer to work, when we need someone it is easier to find him/her. It’s more 
effective to exercise control. It would be harder to control if people were living 
outside.  It’s also better for the Personnel Department to control them and easier 
for organizing activities for them. 
 
Several respondents mentioned the quasi-paternal role managers had when they 
were supervising young migrants working away from their families. Some 
managers spoke about the problems migrants had in returning home, with 
incidences of robbery not uncommon. Hence, feelings of concern and 
paternalism are partly a product of older managers supervising a very young 
workforce. However, as this production manager explains, there was also a 
concern to get to know workers and reduce the distance between labour and 
management, because of the fear of workers grouping together, away from the 
control and isolation of the family unit, making them potentially more resistant 
to management and more strike-prone: 
 
CS: Would you say this [having a dormitory] is like a family as workers are eating, 
working and living together? 
R: It could be summarized as that. 
AL: Who plays the father and mother roles? 
R: The factory manager. 
CS: Are there any disadvantages? 
R: The negative is that if the workers had their family here they would stay longer.  
By living together they might group together and disobey management.  But 
you have to tackle these when they come. 
 
Conclusion 
 
HRM with “Chinese characteristics” (Warner, 2002; 2004) is the most 
appropriate term to describe the situation at JEWELLERY-CO. These 
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characteristics were that labour was recruited from other provinces and not the 
local labour market where the factory was situated. Building a workforce on 
migrants had an ‘in-built’ level of turnover. Recruitment was not only controlled 
by the employer, as different levels of the state and worker-controlled networks 
continued to supply labour to the firm which had implication for management 
control and authority, as we have seen. The housing of workers in industrial 
dormitories meant labour supply for production was easier than in conventional 
settings where the division between work and leisure is not mediated by the 
employer (Smith, 2003; Smith and Pun, 2006). Workers were on short-term 
contracts, and the contract fragmentation for the purposes of increasing 
managerial control remains a major feature of the Chinese workplace (Nichols et 
al 2004). Against some of the optimistic views of others who have suggested skill 
enhancement within FIEs or subcontractor to MNCs in China (Frenkel, 2001) our 
research demonstrates the opposite. Systematic task decomposition, limited on-
the-job training in specialist skills, and no multi-skilling or regular transfer of 
workers between different production departments. A narrow range of Taylorised 
skills was accompanied by a graded wage system, where retention (within a 1 year 
period) was accompanied by modest three-monthly wage rises. Against Frenkel’s 
(2001) findings that wages were higher in FIEs, wage rates in our case company 
were very low, below national legal guidelines and the provincial average, 
suggesting that bargaining power and employer preference, rather than 
ownership is a better determinant of wage levels in the SSEZ. At the enterprise 
level, the company operated impersonal performance-reward relationships, 
intended to stimulate performance and productivity by doing away with non-
contingent rewards. This runs counter to the Western concept of performance-
reward relationship which has a motivational element aimed at enhancing 
performance. Given the weak dependency of managers on workers and workers 
on the company, there was a reliance on material incentives and coercive controls 
to restrict elements of labour turnover deemed disruptive to production. Workers 
knew they would be replaced as their eyesight deteriorated or their lungs filled 
with dust, hence commitment to the firm was structurally absent, and economic 
coercion was used to keep people at work. Management control was also 
exercised through fines and the holding back of workers’ wages in the form of a 
‘deposit’, variously justified on the grounds of accommodating to the inherent 
instability of migrant workers, but nevertheless indicative of economic coercion 
that would be unacceptable in other employment systems, but remains 
widespread in the Chinese system of HRM. Finally, the lack of an organised voice 
for workers, the illegality of strikes, the reluctance of management to embrace 
collective agreements or relations with workers, is again typical of an 
employment system dependent on migrant workers. Management was autocratic 
and directive, allowing little discretion and involvement from subordinates, and a 
paternalistic management style was reinforced by the older nature of Hong Kong 
managers and the youthful nature of the migrant workforce.  
 
Warner (1999: 31) suggests that ‘we are witnessing the emergence of a more 
complex, hybrid management model as marketization advances and as enterprise 
autonomy increases’. Zhu (2005) concludes that the shift from traditional 
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personnel and labour administration to HRM as defined in the West is only 
partial and in its early stages as China is still undergoing transition towards a 
more market-driven economy. Gamble (2003) has suggested aspects of 
convergence, albeit within specific sectors. But Chan (2001), Lee (1998), Smith 
(2003), Pun (2005), Smith and Pun (2006) and Smith and Leung (2005) 
drawing on case studies of assembly factories are more pessimistic about any 
shift of China towards ‘Western’ HR model (a problematic construct given the 
diversity in HR practices discussed in our limited country cases). This is due to 
the weakness of labour as an institutional force; the paternalism and coercion of 
employers; the use of short-term labour contracts that inhibit internalisation of 
human resources within the firm; the extensive use of industrial dormitories that 
facilitate labour turnover and low wages; and the pressures on price operating on 
firms in competitive global product markets. 
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